Responsibility Without Identity

The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many people believe that for someone to now be responsible for some past action, the agent of that action and the responsible agent now must be one and the same person. In other words, many people that moral responsibility presupposes numerical personal identity. In this paper, I show why this platitude is false. I then suggest an account of what actual metaphysical relationship moral responsibility presupposes instead.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

ISBN(s)

10626239

DOI

10.5840/harvardreview20121816

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Personal identity and ethics: a brief introduction.David Shoemaker - 2008 - Buffalo, NY: Broadview Press.
Responsibility in Negligence: Discussion of 'From Normativity to Responsibility'.Ori J. Herstein - forthcoming - Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies.
Am I My Brother's Keeper? On Personal Identity and Responsibility.Simon Beck - 2013 - South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-9.
The Nature and Management of Ethical Corporate Identity: A Commentary on Corporate Identity, Corporate Social Responsibility and Ethics.John M. T. Balmer, Kyoko Fukukawa & Edmund R. Gray - 2007 - Journal of Business Ethics 76 (1):7-15.
All in the Mind? Ethical Identity and the Allure of Corporate Responsibility.Max Baker & John Roberts - 2011 - Journal of Business Ethics 101 (S1):5-15.
Moral responsibility and the self.D. Shoemaker - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press. pp. 487--521.
Corporate identity of a socially responsible university – a case from the turkish higher education sector.M. G. Serap Atakan & Tutku Eker - 2007 - Journal of Business Ethics 76 (1):55 - 68.
Future‐Looking Collective Responsibility: A Preliminary Analysis.Marion Smiley - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):1-11.
Compatibilism and personal identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.
Identity and moral responsibility of healthcare organizations.Martien A. M. Pijnenburg & Bert Gordijn - 2005 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (2):141-160.
Oxford studies in agency and responsibility.David Shoemaker (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Narrative Identity and Personal Responsibility.Linda Ethell - 2010 - Lexington Books.
Synchronic and Diachronic Responsibility.Andrew C. Khoury - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):735-752.
Pushing the Margins of Responsibility: Lessons from Parks’ Somnambulistic Killing.Filippo Santoni de Sio & Ezio Di Nucci - 2017 - Neuroethics 11 (1):35-46.
Bad Memories: Haneke with Locke on Personal Identity and Post-Colonial Guilt.Justine McGill - 2013 - Film-Philosophy 17 (1):134-153.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-10-11

Downloads
865 (#16,071)

6 months
122 (#27,681)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Shoemaker
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.
Is Blameworthiness Forever?Andrew C. Khoury & Benjamin Matheson - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):204-224.
Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism.David Shoemaker - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 303-328.
Compatibilism and personal identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.

View all 70 references / Add more references