Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame

Philosophical Review 126 (4):481-527 (2017)
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Abstract

This essay attempts to provide and defend what may be the first actual argument in support of P. F. Strawson's merely stated vision of a response-dependent theory of moral responsibility. It does so by way of an extended analogy with the funny. In part 1, it makes the easier and less controversial case for response-dependence about the funny. In part 2, it shows the tight analogy between anger and amusement in developing the harder and more controversial case for response-dependence about a kind of blameworthiness. It then defends the view from three serious skeptical challenges.

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David Shoemaker
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Scaffolding agency: A proleptic account of the reactive attitudes.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):301-323.
Artificial Moral Responsibility: How We Can and Cannot Hold Machines Responsible.Daniel W. Tigard - 2021 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30 (3):435-447.
Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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