Realization and Mental Causation

The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:23-33 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if its “forward looking” causal features are a subset of those of the property realized. The instantiation of the realizer property will include the instantiation of the property realized; and when the effects produced are due to the causal features of the latter, it is the instantiation of it that is appropriately regarded as their cause. Epiphenomenalism is avoided, and so is Bealer’s absurd conclusion.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Realization and mental causation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-33.
Mental Causation: Realization and Reduction.Chang-Seong Hong - 2000 - Dissertation, Brown University
Two kinds of role property.Douglas Keaton - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):773-788.
The cost of forfeiting causal inheritance.Justin Thomas Tiehen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):491-507.
Realization and Causal Powers.Umut Baysan - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Glasgow
Realization Realized. [REVIEW]Andrew Melnyk - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (3):185-195.
Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review.David Pineda & Agustín Vicente - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):97-120.
Thoughts on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization.Jaegwon Kim - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):101 - 112.
Subset Realization and Physical Identification.Kevin Morris - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):317-335.
Semifactuals and epiphenomenalism.Danilo Suster - 2001 - Acta Analytica 16 (26):23-43.
Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization.Paul Audi - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):654-674.
On two arguments for subset inheritance.Kevin Morris - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):197-211.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-01-11

Downloads
80 (#190,806)

6 months
6 (#202,901)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sydney Shoemaker
Cornell University

Citations of this work

No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
A determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy.Jessica M. Wilson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):359-385.
Where Do You Get Your Protein? Or: Biochemical Realization.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):799-825.
Metaphysical emergence: Weak and Strong.Jessica Wilson - 2015 - In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wüthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. pp. 251-306.
How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be?Jessica Wilson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):33-52.

View all 156 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references