Personal Identity: Great Debates in Philosophy

&
Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by Richard Swinburne (1984)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What does it mean to say that this person at this time is 'the same' as that person at an earlier time? If the brain is damaged or the memory lost, how far does a person's identity continue? In this book two eminent philosophers develop very different approaches to the problem.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

1991

Call number

BD438.5.S46 1984

ISBN(s)

0631134328   9780631134329   0631132082

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Personal Identity.John Perry (ed.) - 1975 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
What does functionalism tell us about personal identity?Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):682-698.
Functionalism and personal identity.Lawrence H. Davis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):781-804.
Functionalism and personal identity: A reply.Sydney Shoemaker - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):525-533.
Functionalism and personal identity.Nicholas Agar - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):52-70.
Personal identity and consciousness.John Wright - 2006 - Iyyun 55 (July):235-263.
Mental identity.Douglas Ehring - 1984 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):189-194.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
130 (#137,233)

6 months
29 (#104,868)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sydney Shoemaker
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Totipotency, twinning, and ensoulment at fertilization.Rose Koch-Hershenov - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):139 – 164.
Divided we fall.Jacob Ross - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):222-262.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references