Nondeviant Chains in Intentional Action

Journal of Philosophical Research 21:15-49 (1996)
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Abstract

When employing causal terminology in analyzing intentional action, and sometimes in analyzing additional phenomena, philosophers have required that relevant causal chains be free of what they call causal deviance or waywardness. But there is a wider type of deviance that needs to be excluded, of which causal deviance is only a species. Carl Ginet’s On Action considers examples of both types of deviance. A criticism of his treatment of such examples leads to a more satisfactory general analysis of nondeviant chains in terms of the manifestations of powers and the occasions for such manifestations.

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Robert Shope
University of Massachusetts, Boston

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