Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215 (2011)
Abstract |
According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.” According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First, I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can vary despite constancy in representational content
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Keywords | Philosophy |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/s10743-011-9093-y |
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References found in this work BETA
The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.
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Citations of this work BETA
Husserl’s Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness.Kenneth Williford - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
Extending Gurwitsch’s Field Theory of Consciousness.Jeff Yoshimi & David W. Vinson - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 34:104-123.
Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-Representational Phenomenology.Matt Bower - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (3):225-245.
Husserl on Perception: A Nonrepresentationalism That Nearly Was.Matt Bower - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1768-1790.
Prinzipien und Grundlagen der Wahrnehmungsauffassung bei Husserl.Chang Liu - 2019 - Husserl Studies 35 (2):149-176.
View all 7 citations / Add more citations
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2011-05-11
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2011-05-11
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