On stipulation

European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):1100-1114 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When we carry out a speech act of stipulation, it seems that we can shape our language however we see fit. This autonomy, however, also seems to make such acts arbitrary: it is unclear if there are any constraints on what counts as a "correct" or "incorrect" stipulation. In this paper, I offer a novel, detailed account of the pragmatics of stipulation and explain its crucial role in conceptual analysis and articulation. My account shows that stipulation does indeed equip us with a key tool for changing our linguistic practices, but that such acts can nonetheless count as meaningfully, normatively constrained: they are always subject to felicitous criticism and the possibility of defeat by others. I then examine the metaphilosophical implications of this account. Philosophers often describe the project of conceptual analysis as having a crucial stipulative dimension, but they rarely explain what they take this act to consist in. On my view, speech acts of stipulation are best understood as acts that generate a shared inferential entitlement for speaker and audience, an entitlement justified on the basis of its utility. In developing this account, I distinguish stipulations from more familiar speech act kinds such as assertions and commands, synthesize and criticize alternative views of stipulation in the literature, and discuss the relationship between stipulation and seemingly kindred speech acts (such as assumptions, suppositions, and proposals).

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Philosophical Speech Acts.Matthew Shields - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (4):497-521.
Deciding What We Mean.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Truth by stipulation.Robert J. Richman - 1961 - Philosophical Studies 12 (3):33 - 36.
Semantic Stipulation and Knowledge De Re.Chris Tillman & Joshua Spencer - 2012 - In Bill Kabasenche, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew Slater (eds.), Reference and Referring: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Volume 10. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 119-148.
Vague Disagreements: Vagueness Without Arbitrary Stipulation.Elsa Magnell - 2024 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 38 (3-4):157-166.
On a special stipulation of Frege.R. D. Gallie - 1973 - Mind 82 (327):445-449.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-01-28

Downloads
466 (#61,787)

6 months
79 (#77,859)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matthew Shields
Wake Forest University

References found in this work

Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Asserting.Robert Brandom - 1983 - Noûs 17 (4):637-650.

View all 13 references / Add more references