II—Christopher Shields: The Peculiar Motion of Aristotelian Souls

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):139-161 (2007)
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Abstract

Aristotle has qualms about the movement of the soul. He contends directly, indeed, that ‘it is impossible that motion should belong to the soul’ (DA 406a2). This is surprising in both large and small ways. Still, when we appreciate the explanatory framework set by his hylomorphic analysis of change, we can see why Aristotle should think of the soul's motion as involving a kind of category mistake-not the putative Rylean mistake, but rather the mistake of treating a change as itself capable of changing.

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Christopher Shields
University of Notre Dame

References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
Aristotle.Jonathan Barnes - 1982 - In Richard Mervyn Hare, Jonathan Barnes & Henry Chadwick, Founders of thought. New York: Oxford University Press.
Aristotle’s Physics.W. D. Ross - 1936 - Philosophy 11 (43):352-354.
Aristotle's Physics.W. D. Ross - 1936 - Mind 45 (179):378-383.

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