Aristotle and the Theory of Decision (Prohairesis)

Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 11 (20):249-264 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The term of prohairesis was systematically entered in philosophical debates by Aristotle. This concept is generally translated as intention, will, purpose, choice, purposive choice, rational choice, and deliberative choice that the later seems to be Aristotle’s definition of prohairesis. To understand the internal structure of prohairesiss, we have to understand the conceptions of action, intention, belief, whish, will, and virtues. For Aristotle if an action will be done through a decision, this action is voluntary, but its contrary is not credible. He believes that the children and animals act voluntarily, but they have not any decision, because they have not any deliberation.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Aristotle on Prohairesis.Liu Wei - 2016 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 18 (2):50-74.
Choice and Action in Aristotle.A. W. Price - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (4):435-462.
Vice and reason.Terence Irwin - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (1):73-97.
Aristotle's metaphysics of morals.Eugene Garver - 1989 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (1):7-28.
Aristotle's Theory of Human Action.Terrell Ward Bynum - 1986 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Wisdom and Action Guidance in the Agent-Based Virtue Ethics of Aristotle.S. Thomas Sherman - 2006 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):481-506.
What Aristotelian Decisions Cannot Be.Jozef Müller - 2016 - Ancient Philosophy 36 (1):173-195.
Rational choice and action omnipotence.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):1-23.
Rationality revisited.Reed Richter - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):392 – 403.
Deliberation and choice in Aristotle.Heda Segvic - 2011 - In Michael Pakaluk & Giles Pearson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-30

Downloads
25 (#598,332)

6 months
13 (#165,103)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references