On the Normative Authority of Others

Philosophia 42 (2):517-521 (2014)
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Abstract

Gibbard argues that we have to accord others a certain fundamental epistemic normative authority. To avoid skepticism we must accept some of our normative principles; since the influence of others was a major factor in the process that led us to adopt them, we must accord others fundamental normative authority. The argument ought to be of interest to a wide range of philosophers, since while compatible with expressivism, it does not assume expressivism. It has rarely been discussed. In this essay I analyse the argument, explain why it is not sound and make a suggestion about the real upshot of the rejection of normative skepticism

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Yonatan Shemmer
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

A Normative Theory of Disagreement.Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):189-208.

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References found in this work

Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Alan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
The Reasons of Love.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2004 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
The Reasons of Love.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2006 - Princeton University Press.

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