Note on the scope of truth-functional logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (3):327-328 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A plausible and popular rule governing the scope of truth-functional logic is shown to be indequate. The argument appeals to the existence of truth-functional paraphrases which are logically independent of their natural language counterparts. A more adequate rule is proposed

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Borderline Logic.David H. Sanford - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):29-39.
Logic.Stan Baronett - 2008 - Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Functional role and truth conditions.Ned Block - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):157-181.
Free Semantics.Ross Thomas Brady - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):511 - 529.
Functional dependencies, supervenience, and consequence relations.I. L. Humberstone - 1993 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 2 (4):309-336.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
99 (#171,909)

6 months
10 (#255,509)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Formal Logic for Informal Logicians.David Sherry - 2006 - Informal Logic 26 (2):199-220.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references