Disagreement without belief

Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):494-507 (2021)
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Abstract

When theorising about disagreement, it is tempting to begin with a person's belief that p and ask what mental state one must have in order to disagree with it. This is the wrong way to go; the paper argues that people may also disagree with attitudes that are not beliefs. It then examines whether several existing theories of disagreement can account for this phenomenon. It argues that its own normative theory of disagreement gives the best account, and so, given that there is good reason to believe disagreement without belief is possible, there is good reason to think that disagreement itself is normative.

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Author Profiles

Yonatan Shemmer
University of Sheffield
Graham Bex-Priestley
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Disagreement for Dialetheists.Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):192-205.

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References found in this work

Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.
Faultless Disagreement.Max Kolbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
Disagreements about taste.Timothy Sundell - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):267-288.

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