A Sceptical Theory of Scientific Inquiry: problems and Their Progress

Boston: Brill (2020)
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Abstract

_A Sceptical Theory of Scientific Inquiry: Problems and Their Progress_ presents a striking re-interpretation of Popper’s ‘critical rationalism’. Briskman stresses methodological argument rather than metaphysics, develops a ‘Popperian’ response to the Meno Paradox, and takes further Briskman’s approach to problems concerning creativity.

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Jeremy Shearmur
Australian National University

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