Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press (2014)
AbstractLogical pluralism is the view that different logics are equally appropriate, or equally correct. Logical relativism is a pluralism according to which validity and logical consequence are relative to something. Stewart Shapiro explores various such views. He argues that the question of meaning shift is itself context-sensitive and interest-relative.
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Citations of this work
Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.
Making Sense of Logical Pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):433-454.
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