Three types of referential opacity

Philosophy of Science 39 (2):153-161 (1972)
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Abstract

Three distinct things have been called "referential opacity," causing some confusion. A noun position in a sentence may be opaque in three different ways: (1) substitutivity of identity may fail there, (2) quantifiers prefixed to the sentence may not be able to bind variables in that position, or (3) substitutivity of identity may fail when the singular nouns in question are read as having small scope. Some connections among these three types of opacity are examined.

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Citations of this work

Plato'seuthyphro and Leibniz' law.Joel I. Friedman - 1982 - Philosophia 12 (1-2):1-20.
Reply to Widerker.Richard Sharvy - 1973 - Philosophia 3 (4):453-455.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Truth-functionality and referential opacity.Richard Sharvy - 1970 - Philosophical Studies 21 (1-2):5 - 9.
An alternative contextual definition for descriptions.John Bacon - 1965 - Philosophical Studies 16 (5):75 - 76.
Extensional and non-truth-functional contexts.Adam Morton - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):159-164.

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