The Paradox of Epistemic Obligation Avoided

The Reasoner 16:49-50 (2022)
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Abstract

This short paper offers a skeptical solution to Åqvist's paradox of epistemic obligation. The solution is based on the contention that in SDL/KDT logics the externalist features of knowledge, about which we cannot have obligations, are obscured.

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Michael Shaffer
Gustavus Adolphus College

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