Philosophical Review 103 (4):669-688 (1994)

Authors
Scott Shalkowski
University of Leeds
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the wholly metaphysical question of whether necessity and possibility rest on nonmodal foundations—whether the truth conditions for modal statements are, in the final analysis, nonmodal. It is argued that Lewis’s modal realism is either arbitrary and stipulative or else it is circular. Even if there were Lewisean possible worlds, they could not provide the grounds for modality. D. M. Armstrong’s combinatorial approach to possibility suffers from similar defects. Since more traditional reductions to cognitive or linguistic facts suffer similar fates, the conclusion that the alethic modality is primitive and incapable of reduction is offered
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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DOI 10.2307/2186101
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Possibility.D. Armstrong - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):575 - 594.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reductive Theories of Modality.Theodore Sider - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 180-208.
Possible Worlds.Christopher Menzel - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
An Empiricist's Guide to Objective Modality.Jenann Ismael - 2017 - In Matthew Slater & Zanja Yudell (eds.), Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-125.
Real Impossible Worlds : The Bounds of Possibility.Ira Georgia Kiourti - 2010 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews

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