Philosophy of Science 77 (4):477-500 (2010)

Abstract
According to Marr, a computational-level theory consists of two elements, the what and the why. This article highlights the distinct role of the Why element in the computational analysis of vision. Three theses are advanced: that the Why element plays an explanatory role in computational-level theories, that its goal is to explain why the computed function is appropriate for a given visual task, and that the explanation consists in showing that the functional relations between the representing cells are similar to the “external” mathematical relations between the entities that these cells represent.
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DOI 10.1086/656005
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and Psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
The Knowledge Level.Allen Newell - 1982 - Artificial Intelligence 18 (1):81-132.
The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism.John Haugeland - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.

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Citations of this work BETA

Brains as Analog-Model Computers.Oron Shagrir - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):271-279.

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