Philosophia Scientiae 16 (2):85-98 (2012)

Authors
Scott Shalkowski
University of Leeds
Abstract
Chris Daly défend « l'explicationisme », la position selon laquelle l'inférence a la meilleure explication constitue une façon acceptable de justifier une théorie. Il la défend en tentant de justifier la position explicationiste par ses propres ressources, c'est-a-dire par elle-même. Je soutiens que dans le contexte de la métaphysique, cette défense échoue. L'explicationiste échoue à se justifier par ses propres ressources et l'une de ses premisses centrales ne peut pas être justifiée uniquement de façon externaliste.Chris Daly defends "explanationism", the view that inference to the best explanation is an acceptable means of providing warrant for a theory. He does so by attempting the bootstrapping operation of warranting explanationism by way of itself. I argue that in the context of metaphysics this defense fails. It fails to be a genuine bootstrapping operation and one of the key premises cannot be warranted by externalist means alone.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.739
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,226
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-01-18

Total views
38 ( #296,875 of 2,499,690 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #418,206 of 2,499,690 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes