Law, morality, and the guidance of conduct

Legal Theory 6 (2):127-170 (2000)

Abstract

Legal positivism is generally characterized by its commitment to two theses Separability Thesis,” denies any necessary connection between morality and legality. Legal positivists do not require that a norm possess any desirable, or lack any undesirable, moral attributes in order to count as law

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,805

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-23

Downloads
62 (#188,120)

6 months
2 (#257,900)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

General Jurisprudence: A 25th Anniversary Essay.Leslie Green - 2005 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25 (4):565-580.
Genetics and Criminal Responsibility.Stephen J. Morse - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (9):378-380.
Joseph Raz’s Theory of Authority.Kenneth Ehrenberg - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):884-894.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Stability, Assurance, and the Concept of Legal Guidance.Adam Hill - 2015 - Law and Philosophy 34 (2):141-171.
Positivism And The Inseparability Of Law And Morals.Leslie Green - 2008 - New York University Law Review 83:1035--1058.
Incorporation by Law.Joseph Raz - 2004 - Legal Theory 10 (1):1-17.
Should Law Improve Morality?Leslie Green - 2013 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (3):473-494.
Common Sense Morality Versus Role Morality.Ján Kalajtzidis - 2012 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 2 (3-4):133-143.
Legal Positivism and the Moral Aim Thesis.David Plunkett - 2013 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (3):563-605.