Abstract
In recent publications, Fodor points out a basic impasse that the representational-computational view of mind confronts. Mental representations have to serve two functions—to be the substrate of mental computations and to be the carriers of meaning. Fodor points out that these two functions cannot be brought together and concludes that semantics is not part of psychology. On the basis of similar observations, I suggest drawing another conclusion, namely, that the premises of the representational-computational view are wrong, and that psychology is not mentalistic. The discussion presents a fundamental contrast between two notions of the key term semantics. These, in turn, define two different perspectives for cognitive research. A third perspective for the study of meaning and cognition is suggested. With it, it is argued, the Fodorian impasse is avoided
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DOI 10.1111/1468-5914.00067
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