Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):1-20 (2014)

Authors
Elizabeth Shaw
University of Aberdeen
Abstract
Advances in neuroscience might make it possible to develop techniques for directly altering offenders’ brains, in order to make offenders more responsible and law-abiding. The idea of using such techniques within the criminal justice system can seem intuitively troubling, even if they were more effective in preventing crime than traditional methods of rehabilitation. One standard argument against this use of brain interventions is that it would undermine the individual’s free will. This paper maintains that ‘free will’ (at least, as that notion is understood by those who adopt the influential compatibilist approach) is an inadequate basis for explaining what is problematic about some direct brain interventions. This paper then defends an alternative way of objecting to certain kinds of direct brain interventions, focusing on the relationship between the offender and the state rather than the notion of free will. It opposes the use of interventions which aim to enhance ‘virtue responsibility’ (by instilling particular values about what is right and wrong), arguing that this would objectify offenders. In contrast, it argues that it may be acceptable to use direct brain interventions to enhance ‘capacity responsibility’ (i.e. to strengthen the abilities necessary for the exercise of responsible agency, such as self-control). Finally it considers how to distinguish these different kinds of responsibility enhancement
Keywords Responsibility  Moral enhancement  Free will  Neurolaw  Rehabilitation  Dialogue  Objectification  Neuroenhancement
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DOI 10.1007/s11572-012-9152-2
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References found in this work BETA

What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.

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Citations of this work BETA

Direct Vs. Indirect Moral Enhancement.G. Owen Schaefer - 2015 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25 (3):261-289.
Punishing Intentions and Neurointerventions.David Birks & Alena Buyx - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (3):133-143.

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