Can Truth‐Conditional Theorists of Content Do Without ‘That’‐Clause Ascriptions?

Analytic Philosophy 61 (1):1-27 (2019)
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Abstract

Hartry Field has proposed a fundamental division of theories of linguistic and mental content into those that do, and those that don’t, give a central role to ‘that’-clause ascriptions. Here I investigate the commitments of theories that (in accord with Field’s position) deny ‘that’-clause ascriptions a central role, but (in contrast to Field’s position) give truth conditions a central role. Such non-oblique truth-conditionalism promises significant advantages. However, the stance is costlier than it may appear. Non-oblique truth-conditionalists, I argue, must renounce a priori entitlement to schemas of disquotation that are presupposed when theories of content are put to metaphysical or epistemological use. As case studies, I discuss two theories that might seem to exemplify non-oblique truth-conditionalism: David Chalmers’s two-dimensionalist theory of content and Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantics.

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Lionel Shapiro
University of Connecticut

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Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.

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