A clearer vision

Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53 (1997)
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Abstract

Frances Egan argues that the states of computational theories of vision are individuated individualistically and, as far as the theory is concerned, are not intentional. Her argument depends on equating the goals and explanatory strategies of computational psychology with those of its algorithmic level. However, closer inspection of computational psychology reveals that the computational level plays an essential role in explaining visual processes and that explanations at this level are nonindividualistic and intentional. In conclusion, I sketch an account of content in which content does the sort of explanatory work that Egan denies is possible

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Lawrence Shapiro
University of Wisconsin, Madison

References found in this work

Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
Physical symbol systems.Allen Newell - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (2):135-83.
The nature and plausibility of cognitivism.John Haugeland - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.

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