Criticism of Falsifiability

Abstract

Thomas Kuhn criticized falsifiability because it characterized "the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts," and it cannot be generalized. In Kuhn's view, a delimitation criterion must refer to the functioning of normal science. Kuhn objects to Popper's entire theory and excludes any possibility of rational reconstruction of the development of science. Imre Lakatos said that if a theory is scientific or non-scientific, it can be determined independently of the facts.He proposed a modification of Popper's criterion, which he called "sophisticated (methodological) falsification". DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30572.82568

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Nicolae Sfetcu
Romanian Academy

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Against method.Paul Feyerabend - 1975 - London: New Left Books.
Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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