Interprétationnisme ou institutionnalisme?

Philosophiques 32 (1):169-190 (2005)
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According to interpretationism, nothing can be intentionally meant, thought or performed independently of our interpretational practice. The presence of an interpretation (explicit or implicit) is a necessary condition on the existence of intentional contents expressed by verbal, mental or behavioral occurrences. In this paper, I criticize Donald Davidson’s interpretationism. I first characterize the view in its broad outlines. I then proceed to formulate some criticisms against it, and sketch an alternative approach : institutionalism. This approach suggests another way to conceive of the relationship between meaning, understanding, intentional states and actions on the one hand, and ascriptive practices on the other hand. It is a relation between types and not between occurrences, and it is claimed that the types of states or acts that can express intentional contents do not exist independently of certain types of institutional facts.



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Michel Seymour
Université de Montréal

Citations of this work

Questions d'interprétation.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Philosophiques 32 (1):191-206.

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References found in this work

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 12 (1):109-110.

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