What is a Reason to Act?

Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235 (2014)
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Abstract

Argues for a conception of reasons as premises of practical reasoning. This conception is applied to questions about ignorance, advice, enabling conditions, "ought," and evidence.

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Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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