Reasons Without Rationalism: A Virtue Theory of Phronesis
Dissertation, Princeton University (
2002)
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Abstract
An agent's character is often revealed in the contents of her practical reasoning, in the considerations to which she is sensitive and how she is moved by them, in the acts she considers, the ends she adopts, and in how she plans for the present and the future. According to an influential view, we can distinguish the assessment of practical thought as good or bad reasoning from its assessment as an expression of character. For instance, we might think that good reasoning is a matter of practical rationality, or that it is a matter of means-end efficiency, and that, while efficiency and rationality are virtues, they are independent of the virtues of character. Against this view, I argue that an agent has phronesis---the virtue of practical reason---just in case she has the virtues of character in her dispositions of practical thought. ;In Chapter One, I consider the view that phronesis consists in practical rationality. I argue that, even on the most charitable reading, this view is false. Once we set aside interpretations of "practical rationality" on which it would be trivial or absurd to claim that it constitutes phronesis, we are left with an interpretation on which practical irrationality is analogous to moral culpability. Practical irrationality involves a culpable failure of practical reasoning, and since not every instance of bad practical reasoning is culpable, practical rationality is necessary but not sufficient for phronesis. ;In Chapter Two, I argue against the instrumentalist view that phronesis consists in means-end efficiency, and I present a general argument for the "virtue theory," according to which the dispositions of practical reasoning involved in the virtues of character are essential to phronesis. The argument is that alternative views need to motivate their restrictions on the range of virtues that matter to phronesis, as something other than arbitrary, and that the relevant attempts at motivation fall. ;Chapter Three rebuts a number of objections to the view developed so far. I end with some tentative remarks about the status of moral reasons, and about the need for a substantive metaphysics of virtue.