Epistemic Injustice The Third Way?

Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):174-177 (2003)
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Abstract

In response to Miranda Fricker's advocacy of a virtue of ‘reflexive critical openness’, I emphasise the importance of other virtues, such as loyalty, in evaluating an agent's response to testimony, and I query Fricker's claim that in certain circumstances agents can lack a means to correct their faulty evaluations of another's testimony.

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Sadie Marshall
University of Sussex

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Epistemic Injustice.Rachel McKinnon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446.

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