Truth & use

Synthese 128 (1-2):1 - 13 (2001)
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Abstract

I show why the standard textbook argument against thepragmatist reconstruction of truth should be dismissedas a fallacy. It only works if one inadvertentlysubstitutes for the pragmatist concept of knowledge anunreconstructed one that predates the experimentalrevolution in philosophy (likened to the Copernicanrevolution in astronomy) started by Kant and completedby Dewey. I argue (as did Dewey against Russell) thatthe concept of propositions as mental reconstructionsof what is the case converts a function in inquiryinto an independent structure, which is anotherfallacy.

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References found in this work

Context and Thought.John Dewey - 1931 - University of California Publications in Philosophy 12 (3):203ff.
Propositions, warranted assertibility, and truth.John Dewey - 1941 - Journal of Philosophy 38 (7):169-186.

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