Personale Autonomie als praktische Autorität

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (6):897-915 (2011)
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Abstract

Autonomy and authority are often regarded as opposites. In this paper, I argue that autonomy should be conceived of as a specific form of (practical) authority and that this perspective is useful for identifying the conditions of personal autonomy. I will first highlight some structural analogies in the functioning of the concepts "autonomy" and "authority" and explain the resulting constraints on accounts of personal autonomy. I will then show that the problems of certain internalist and externalist accounts of autonomy are rooted in a false understanding of the foundation on which the authority that is characteristic of autonomy rests. To conclude, I present an account in which this foundation is given by a person’s maturity (Mündigkeit), defensiveness (Wehrhaftigkeit) and participation (Mitsprache): Thus, a person is autonomous to the extent that she can cope with her own affairs, can defend herself against external encroachments and can participate in common affairs.

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Christian Seidel
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)

Citations of this work

Einleitung.Mathias Lindenau & Marcel Meier Kressig - 2023 - In Mathias Lindenau & Marcel Meier Kressig (eds.), Autonomie: Maßstab, Ideal oder Illusion? Vadian Lectures Band 9. transcript Verlag. pp. 7-28.

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