Abstract
Autonomy and authority are often regarded as opposites.
In this paper, I argue that autonomy should be conceived of as a
specific form of (practical) authority and that this perspective is
useful for identifying the conditions of personal autonomy. I will
first highlight some structural analogies in the functioning of the
concepts "autonomy" and "authority" and explain the resulting
constraints on accounts of personal autonomy. I will then show that
the problems of certain internalist and externalist accounts of
autonomy are rooted in a false understanding of the foundation on
which the authority that is characteristic of autonomy rests. To
conclude, I present an account in which this foundation is given by a
person’s maturity (Mündigkeit), defensiveness (Wehrhaftigkeit) and
participation (Mitsprache): Thus, a person is autonomous to the extent
that she can cope with her own affairs, can defend herself against
external encroachments and can participate in common affairs.