“Embodying” the Internet: Towards the Moral Self via Communication Robots? [Book Review]

Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):285-307 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Abstract   Internet communication technology has been said to affect our sense of self by altering the way we construct “personal identity,” understood as identificatory valuative narratives about the self; in addition, some authors have warned that internet communication creates special conditions for moral agency that might gradually change our moral intuitions. Both of these effects are attributed to the fact that internet communication is “disembodied.” Our aim in this paper is to establish a link between this complex of claims and past and ongoing research in phenomenology, empirical psychology and cognitive science, in order to formulate an empirical hypothesis that can assist development and evaluation of recent technology for embodied telecommunication. We first suggest that for the purposes of interdisciplinary exchange, personal identity is formally best represented by a selection function that (for temporal intervals of variable length) “bundles” capacity ascriptions into identificatory narratives. Based on this model, we discuss which cultural changes engendered by the internet affect the construction of personal identity in ways that diminish our ethical sensitivies. In a second step, working from phenomenological claims by Martin Buber, we argue that disembodied communication severs two modes of cognitive function, preconceptual and conceptual, which tie together moral motivation, self-experience, and identity construction. We translate Buber’s claims into the theoretical idiom of the “theory of cognitive orientation,” a psychological theory of motivation that links up with recent research in embodied cognition. In a third step, we investigate whether the embodiment of the internet with communication robots (e.g., telenoids) holds out the prospect of reverting this structural change at least partially. We conclude by formulating an empirical hypothesis (for researchers in cognitive science) that has direct import, we submit, on the question whether embodied telecommunication promises a new form of ethically sensitive self-constituting encounter. Content Type Journal Article Category Special Issue Pages 1-23 DOI 10.1007/s13347-012-0064-9 Authors Johanna Seibt, Department for Philosophy and the History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Marco Nørskov, Department for Philosophy and the History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Journal Philosophy & Technology Online ISSN 2210-5441 Print ISSN 2210-5433

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Ghosts in the Machine: Do the Dead Live on in Facebook?Patrick Stokes - 2012 - Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):363-379.
Personal Identity Online.Raffaele Rodogno - 2012 - Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):309-328.
Degenerate epistemology.Luciano Floridi - 2012 - Philosophy and Technology 25 (1):1-3.
Should Probabilistic Design Replace Safety Factors?Neelke Doorn & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Philosophy and Technology 24 (2):151-168.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-02-18

Downloads
71 (#223,072)

6 months
8 (#292,366)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?