Homogeneity in Aristotle's Metaphysics
Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh (
2002)
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Abstract
In this dissertation, I investigate the role of Aristotle's theory of science, and specifically the homogeneity criterion, for the set-up of Aristotle's metaphysics project as sketched in Met. IV, 1--3 and VI, 1. I argue that Aristotelian metaphysics takes shape through a dialectical argument stretching from Met. I to VI, 1. Along this path, both Aristotle's theory of science , and the Platonist competitor in metaphysics are constantly kept in view. They propel the argument at crucial stages. The resulting metaphysics is compatible with Aristotle's theory of science, though it is not a direct application of it. Rather, metaphysics is a content-neutral complement to the content-specific sciences. The Platonist competitor remains refuted. Some of its central ideas and tools are nevertheless assimilated into Aristotelian metaphysics. ;Aristotle's postulate of a universal science of being seems to contradict a central requirement for a science: the homogeneity principle. According to the Posterior Analytics, every science has its specific subject matter , which it explores in terms of predicative content, and to which it is restricted. Being, does not constitute such a genos. Aristotle has to find a feature which can play a role for 'being' that is analogous to 'genos' in a special science. Aristotle finds it in the pros hen notion . Pros hen makes the content-neutral, focal structure of being transparent. It is not an extension of synonymy . With the help of pros hen, Aristotle can construct a content-neutral universal metaphysics project, solving the puzzles which arose in III, 1/2 precisely as a conflict between the questions which metaphysics should address and the homogeneity criterion for content-specific sciences. His theory of science remains fully intact for the sciences for which it was designed. The objections against Platonist metaphysics remain in place as well. The content-neutral analysis of being meets the expectations formulated for metaphysics in I, 1/2, on the basis of endoxa. Aristotle's project is constituted by what is commonly called 'general metaphysics'. It includes a consideration of the divine