Abstract

This dissertation prepares the way for a comprehensive study of David Hume's ontology. It is explained that Hume's philosophy displays a complex attitude such that the philosopher cannot be said to have one specific ontology. Yet, attention to Hume's program, and the foundation he intends for his epistemology and ethics reveals a "strict ontology" that is taken as certain, and claimed within all Hume's attempts at disclaimers. ;This strict ontology is the focus of the dissertation. It is explicated from its essential presentation in Book I of the Treatise, and the consequences of this ontology are judged within and for the goals of this strict ontology. ;The argument for this ontology is discussed, and various immediate problems with the ontology's delimitation of "existence" to "perceptions" are displayed. Some brief time is spent on Hume's difficulties with accounting for "belief" and the conceiving of non-existent things. ;The central research of the dissertation asks the question: "What are perceptions, for Hume?" The research turns up six common characteristics of all Humean perceptions. They are: present to the mind; inert; particular; independent; perishing; and having aspects. Hume attempts a taxonomy of perceptions into: ideas/impressions; complex/simple; extended/non-extended. But, it is shown that his strict ontology is too restrictive to make these distinctions. ;The dissertation then discusses "relations" for and within Hume's strict ontology. It is pointed out that Hume requires a "relating" operation of some kind, and intends that the result of the relating produce a whole. However, after all of the candidates are reviewed to provide the conditions for these intended results, it is concluded that within Hume's strict ontology he cannot have the relating nor the wholes he needs. ;It is also pointed out that the kinds of relations he can have within his strict ontology are counter to what he intends. "Dispositions," "manners," "aspects," are relations, at least perceivable, but they do not result in wholes. It is also shown that some of the possible meanings for "relation" within his strict ontology unearth relations that are unmade relations. Such relations are counter to external relations which Hume wants in order to render all relations between matters of fact contingent. ;The dissertation attempts to show that Hume's concept of time is a co-determinant of his strict ontology. This Humean concept of time has been unnoticed in the Humean scholarship, and by Hume, or has been treated with ancillary concern. Hume's approach to "time" is discussed and it is shown that Hume treats it as accessible to conception and as a spatial thing. Hume's concept of time is then briefly contrasted with Husserl's and Heidegger's understanding of "time," and the consequences of Hume's atomistic conception of time are discussed. ;The dissertation then concludes by discussing how Hume's intentions, methods and his predilection for a praxis favored perceptions as objects of certainty. It is shown that these motives lead Hume to a strict ontology that is even too frugal for what Hume needs for his own program