Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):149-181 (2004)

Sonia Sedivy
University of Toronto at Scarborough
This paper explores a new understanding of mind or mental representation by arguing that contents at the personal level are not carried by vehicles. Contentful mental states at the personal level are distinctive by virtue of their vehicle-less nature: the subpersonal physiological or functional states that are associated with and enable personal level contents cannot be understood as their vehicles, neither can the sensations or the sensory conditions associated with perceptual contents. This result is obtained by first extending the interpretationist ideas of Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett to show that subpersonal physiological or functional states cannot be construed as the vehicles of personal level contents. Then the anti-foundationalist arguments of Wilfrid Sellars are extended to show that sensory states cannot stand as vehicles to perceptual contents. The line of argumentation extended from Sellars also provides a critique of the current trend to posit non-conceptual contents
Keywords Foundationalism  Metaphysics  Mind  Physicalism  Vehicle  Donald Davidson  Wilfrid Sellars  Reduction  Nonconceptual Content
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DOI 10.1080/0951508042000239020
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References found in this work BETA

Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
Pattern and Being.John Haugeland - 1993 - In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Delocalized Mind. Judgements, Vehicles, and Persons.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):1-24.
Nonconceptual Epicycles.Sonia Sedivy - 2006 - European Review of Philosophy 6:33-66.
The Thesis of Nonconceptual Content.Michael Tye - 2006 - European Review of Philosophy 6:7-30.
Explaining Reference: A Plea for Semantic Psychologism.Santiago Echeverri - 2014 - In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. University of Geneva. pp. 550-580.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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