Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):455-483 (1995)

Sonia Sedivy
University of Toronto at Scarborough
The paper argues that Daniel Dennett’s reductive account of consciousness in Consciousness Explained goes against theoretical commitments driving much of his previous work. I focus on considerations for the plurality of distinctive explanation of ourselves, as they have been articulated in Dennett's earlier work, and argue that Dennett's reductive framework is not adequately supported in the face of these considerations. The paper details tensions in Dennett’s work and shows how Consciousness Explained departs from the diagnoses of the mind/body problem offered by Ryle, Wittgenstein and Sellars with which Dennett casts it as continuous.
Keywords Daniel Dennett  Concsiousness  Reductionism  Gilbert Ryle  Consciousness Explained
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI cjphil199525322
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosopical Quarterly 44 (175):190-205.
The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):190.
The Message Is: There is No Medium. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):919-931.

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Citations of this work BETA

Minds: Contents Without Vehicles.Sonia Sedivy - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):149-181.

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