Authors
John R. Searle
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
This article presents a sketch of a theory of action. It does so by locating the relation of intention to action -vithin a general theory of Intentionality. It introduces a distinction between ptiorintentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally self-referential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they allow suggested solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the accordion effect, basic actions, etc.); the demonstration of striking similarities between the logical structure of intentional action and the logical structure of perception; and the construction of an account of simple actions. A successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists of an intention in action together with the bodily movement or state of the agent which is its condition of satisfaction and which is caused by it. The account is extended to complex actions.
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DOI 10.1080/00201747908601876
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom to Act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge.
Freedom and Action.Roderick Chisholm - 1966 - In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Random House.
Thought and Action.Stuart Hampshire - 1959 - University of Notre Dame Press.
What is an Intentional State?John R. Searle - 1979 - Mind 88 (January):74-92.

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Citations of this work BETA

Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intrinsic Intentionality.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):450-457.

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The Motivational Strength of Intentions.Renée Bilodeau - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:129-135.

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