In defense of Duhem

Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):287-294 (1965)
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Abstract

Adolph Grünbaum has argued that Duhem's conventionalism is false for the case of Euclidean geometry. According to Duhem, any portion of a physical theory can be preserved from falsifiability by providing suitable modifications elsewhere in the theory. Grünbaum argues that physical theory is composed of two parts: A geometrical part H, and a physical part A. For his test case—Euclidean geometry—he contends that by a suitable specification of A, a falsification of H is possible; i.e., H can be rendered “accessible to experimental ascertainment in isolation from other physical regularities.”

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References found in this work

The Duhemian Argument.Adolf Grünbaum - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (1):75 - 87.
The Principle of Relativity.A. Whitehead - 1923 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 30 (3):7-8.
Relativity and the Atomicity of Becoming.Adolf Grünbaum - 1950 - Review of Metaphysics 4 (2):143 - 186.

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