Abstract

Since Wilfred Sellars' "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," it has been standard philosophical fare to conceive of vernacular psychology as an empirical theory of mind and behavior. I argue that vernacular psychology is not best understood as an empirical theory of mind and behavior. ;If you do view vernacular psychology as an empirical theory you must vindicate it. I argue that this amounts to demonstrating that intentional content can play a role in the science of psychology. I investigate two narrow content strategies: Those of Brian Loar and Jerry Fodor. I argue that the first is unmotivated and makes incomprehensible vernacular psychological practice. The second strategy founders on the problem of misrepresentation; such an individualist psychology is a neurology. ;I turn to Tyler Burge's non-individualist psychology, and point out that it cannot serve to vindicate vernacular intentional psychology. Non-individualism can make no good sense of mental causation. ;Finally, we face the following difficulty: There is no science of the intentional; no science makes a comfortable place for intentional content. I argue that we should conclude, not that eliminativism is true, but that vernacular psychology is not a causal theory of mind and behavior. Intentional characterization makes possible the normative evaluation of subjects. Here I argue that there would be no justification for appeal to content without the coherent possibility of such evaluation; and where the possibility of such evaluation exists, so are attributions of determinate intentional content demanded