Can You Succeed in Intentionally Deceiving Yourself?

Humana Mente 5 (20):17-40 (2012)
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According to intentionalists, self-deceivers exercise the sort of control over their belief-forming processes that, in standard cases of interpersonal deception, the deceiver exercises over the deceived’s belief forming processes — they intentionally deceive themselves. I’ll argue here that interpersonal deception is not an available model for the sort of putatively distinctive control the self-deceiver exercises over her belief-forming processes and beliefs. I concentrate attention on a kind of case in which an agent allegedly intentionally causes herself to come to have a false belief. I hope to show that contrary to appearances, the agents in such cases do not intentionally cause themselves to have false beliefs — do not intentionally deceive themselves. Indeed, if we take the model of interpersonal intentional deception seriously, we ought to conclude that a self-deceiver, so regarded, deceives herself unintentionally.



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References found in this work

Sour grapes: studies in the subversion of rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme.
Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Engaging Reason.Joseph Raz - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):745-748.
Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.

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