On Content-Independent Reasons: It’s Not in the Name

Law and Philosophy 28 (3):233 - 260 (2009)
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Abstract

Argues that content-independent reasons are intentions. Relies on Grice's distinction between natural and non-natural meaning. Rejects previous accounts, and argues that his account can understand the force of such reasons appropriately, through the conept of enabling-conditions. Illustrates through several paridigmatic types of content-independent reasons.

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Stefan Sciaraffa
McMaster University

Citations of this work

Authority and Reason‐Giving.David Enoch - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):296-332.
In defense of content-independence.Nathan Adams - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (3):143-167.
Political obligation.Richard Dagger - unknown - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Promises.Allen Habib - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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