Weltverhältnis und Weltverlust. Versuch über Skepsis und Metaphysik der Modalität
Dissertation, Université de Fribourg (
2021)
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Abstract
I maintain that substantive metaphysics makes an ineliminable contribution to our mind’s cognitive relation to objects. To account for the precise nature of this metaphysical contribution, I investigate domains of thought in which our cognitive relation to objects appears problematic. In perception, an experience’s metaphysical dependence upon objects and their essences ground its content and, in part, epistemic worth. Regarding metaphysical modality, viewing modality and actuality as equally fundamental is pivotal to understanding our modal knowledge and thought. Relating to the ontological argument, and necessary existents generally, understanding ontological statuses as differences in the way an object’s properties are grounded contributes to explaining our thoughts’ relation to objects. Systematic and historical research are integrated in developing these philosophical views, drawing on Descartes, Baumgarten, and Kant in particular.