Why Nous Cannot Be a Magnitude: De Anima I.3

In Caleb Cohoe (ed.), Aristotle's on the Soul: A Critical Guide. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 50-65 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I examine Aristotle’s reasons in DA I.3 for rejecting the claim that understanding (nous) is a magnitude (megethos), an idea Aristotle associates most explicitly with Plato, who describes nous as a self-moving circle in the Timaeus. Aristotle shows that his definition of soul, on which soul is not a magnitude or body of any kind, can explain perception, thought, and motion better than his predecessor’s materialist accounts. But unlike perception and motion, nous is not actualized through the body nor does it have a bodily organ, which makes nous a very different kind of soul capacity. Earlier thinkers, including Plato, already maintain that nous does not have a bodily organ, but they cannot explain how nous could operate or be a mover without being some sort of body itself. Even in the Timaeus, nous is described as being a kind of magnitude. But if nous were a magnitude of any kind, Aristotle claims it would not be able to think or reason. There is something about being a magnitude qua magnitude that makes reason impossible. His critique of Plato in I.3 prepares the way for his account of nous in DA III.4.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Thought and Perception in Aristotle's "de Anima".John Edward Sisko - 1995 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
Nous in Aristotle's De Anima.Caleb Murray Cohoe - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (9):594-604.
The Nous-Body Problem in Aristotle.Deborah K. W. Modrak - 1991 - Review of Metaphysics 44 (4):755 - 774.
Nous Poietikos: Survey of Earlier Interpretations.Franz Brentano - 1995 [1992] - In Martha Craven Nussbaum & Amélie Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 313-341.
Incorporeal Nous and the Science of the Soul in Aristotle’s De anima.Adam Wood - 2012 - International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):169-182.
What Does the Maker Mind Make?Aryeh Kosman - 1995 [1992] - In Martha Craven Nussbaum & Amélie Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 343-358.
The Virtue Of God In Aristotle.Marguerite Deslauriers - 2004 - Philosophy and Theology 16 (1):3-23.
Why the View of Intellect in De Anima I 4 Isn’t Aristotle’s Own.Caleb Cohoe - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (2):241-254.
Commentary On Vasiliou.Arthur Madigan - 2013 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 28 (1):181-184.
Aristotle's De Anima : On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities.Rebekah Johnston - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2):185-200.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-11-11

Downloads
11 (#976,244)

6 months
2 (#670,035)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references