What makes reasons sufficient?

American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):159-170 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper addresses the question: ‘what makes reasons sufficient?’ and offers the answer, ‘being at least as weighty as the reasons for the alternatives’. The paper starts by introducing some of the reasons why sufficiency has seemed difficult to understand, particularly in epistemology, and some circumstantial evidence that this has contributed to more general problems in the epistemological literature. It then introduces the positive account of sufficiency, and explains how this captures sufficiency in both the practical and epistemic domains. Finally, the paper shows how once we understand the nature of sufficiency, it is easy to predict the full variety of ways in which rationality – both of action and of belief – can be defeated

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Humean agent-neutral reasons?Daan Evers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.
Can there be epistemic reasons for action?Anthony Robert Booth - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
Reason in action.John Gibbons - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. pp. 72.
Having reasons and the factoring account.Errol Lord - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.
Intrinsic values and reasons for action.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):342-363.
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Asymmetrical Practical Reasons.Patricia Greenspan - 2005 - In J. C. Marek & M. E. Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Vienna: ÖBV and HPT. pp. 387-94.
The Prospects for Sufficientarianism.Liam Shields - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (1):101-117.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-04

Downloads
260 (#71,109)

6 months
1 (#1,040,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California

References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references