Noûs 50 (4):759-793 (2016)

Authors
Andreas Stokke
Uppsala University
Anders Schoubye
Stockholm University
Abstract
It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning using the notion of a question under discussion. This account explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined, provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences can come to have enriched meanings in context, and shows why various alternative views, e.g. so-called Radical Contextualism, Moderate Contextualism, and Semantic Minimalism, are partially right in their respective analyses of the problem, but also all ultimately wrong. Our analysis achieves this result using a standard truth conditional and compositional semantics and without making any assumptions about enriched logical forms, i.e. logical forms containing phonologically null expressions.
Keywords Semantics  What is said  Semantics of Questions  Radical Contextualism  Minimalism  Questions under Discussion
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1111/nous.12133
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References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Literal Meaning.François Recanati - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):731-751.
Lying and Misleading in Discourse.Andreas Stokke - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (1):83-134.
Lying, Speech Acts, and Commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.
Pragmatic Particularism.Ray Buchanan & Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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