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Words About Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology
Dissertation, University of California Berkeley (1997)
Abstract
In this dissertation, I examine three philosophically important concepts that play a foundational role in developmental psychology: theory, representation, and belief. I describe different ways in which the concepts have been understood and present reasons why a developmental psychologist, or a philosopher attuned to cognitive development, should prefer one understanding of these concepts over another.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
Against the Deflationary Account of Self-Deception.José Eduardo Porcher - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20):67-84.
Speaking without interpreting: A reply to bouma on autism and Davidsonian interpretation.Kristin Andrews & Ljiljana Radenovic - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):663 – 678.
What theory of mind can teach social psychology: traits as intentional terms.A. D. Rosati, E. D. Knowles, C. W. Kalish, A. Gopnik, D. R. Ames & M. W. Morris - 2001 - In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press.
Atribución intencional en casos de esquizofrenia: una perspectiva davidsoniana.María Emilia Vilatta - 2017 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 53:11-50.
References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
Metaphors we live by.George Lakoff & Mark Johnson - 1980 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Mark Johnson.
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