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Uncertain preferences in rational decision
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (6):605-627 (2020)
Abstract
ABSTRACT Is uncertainty about preferences rationally possible? And if so, does it matter for rational decision? It is argued that uncertainty about preferences is possible and should play the same role in rational decision-making as uncertainty about worldly facts. The paper develops this hypothesis and defends it against various objections.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2021 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.
Informed Consent Under Ignorance.Daniel Villiger - forthcoming - American Journal of Bioethics:1-13.
References found in this work
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1969 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.
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