In The Fragmented Mind. New York, NY, USA: pp. 350-375 (2021)

Eric Schwitzgebel
University of California, Riverside
On an intellectualist approach to belief, the intellectual endorsement of a proposition (such as “The working poor deserve as much respect as the handsomely paid”) is sufficient or nearly sufficient for believing it. On a pragmatic approach to belief, intellectual endorsement is not enough. Belief is behaviorally demanding. To really, fully believe, you must also “walk the walk.” This chapter argues that the pragmatic approach is preferable on pragmatic grounds: It rightly directs our attention to what matters most in thinking about belief.
Keywords behavior  belief  intellectualism  pragmatism  propositional attitudes  implicit bias
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Epistemic Paternalism Via Conceptual Engineering.Eve Kitsik - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
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