The Difference Between Moral and Rational “Oughts”: An Expressivist Account

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):159-174 (2012)

Abstract

Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim “you ought to help others” is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the rational maxim “you ought to brush your teeth twice a day”. But it seems that there is a crucial difference these two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I argue that this difference is to be understood as a difference between two kinds of normativity: demanding and recommending normativity. But the crucial task is, of course, to explain the difference. In the second part of this paper, I suggest that metaethical expressivists can provide a good explanation: by extending the analysis of ordinary (non-normative) demands and recommendations to normative judgments, they can formulate a convincing account that captures the key differences between morality and rationality

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Peter Schulte
University of Zürich

References found in this work

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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