Abstract

This volume follows up a previous work by Zimmerman,Living with Uncertainty, and continues his investigation of the metaethics of uncertainty. This installment centers on defending his favored view of moral obligation from various criticisms he has encountered since first articulating it. Ignorance and Moral Obligationincludes several clarifications of the prospective view, including repeated emphasis on "projected" rather than "expected" outcomes. As a straight philosophy text, this book will be useful for faculty and graduate students who read the previous book and found it interesting. It will be less useful for those unfamiliar with Living with Uncertainty or those interested in an attempt to address uncertainty from anywhere other than metaethics. For example, the distinction between "projected" and "expected" outcomes would be familiar to economists and other decision theorists; however, this literature goes unmentioned. Moreover, one of Zimmerman’s repeated cases deals with "testimony" as a social epistemic source; discussion of this literature is also left aside. As a metaethical defense of Zimmerman's view, this volume seems to work. As a contribution to an interdisciplinary understanding of one's moral responsibilities, more work remains.